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HARD-CORE PORNOGRAPHY: A
PROPOSAL FOR A PER SE RULE
Bruce A. Taylor*
Public opinion polls reveal that many American people want
the government to crack down harder on pornography and to
restrict access to pornography that meets the legal standard of
obscenity. 1 The Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that obscenity is without first amendment protection. 2 Why, then, does
the problem of hard-core pornography persist? The Attorney
General's Commission on Pornography concluded in 1986 that
hard-core pornography flourishes in violation of existing laws
due to "underinvestigation, underprosecution, and undersentencing. " 8 This Article suggests that those findings are mere
symptoms of a more severe ailment. A more fundamental problem is the complexity of the legal test for obscenity, which leads
to discouragement of law enforcement efforts and inconsistent
judicial rulings.
Part I of this Article discusses the history and pervasiveness
of the pornography problem. Part II explains the current legal
test for obscenity, as evolved from Miller v. California,• with an
emphasis on terms commonly used in the definition of obscenity.
• Vice President and General Counsel, Citizens for Decency Through Law, Inc.
(CDL), Phoenix, Arizona; Former Assistant Prosecutor and Assistant Director of Law
and Special Prosecutor for obscenity cases for the City of Cleveland, Ohio. B.A., University of Vermont, 1972; J.D., Cleveland State University, 1974. I wish to thank Len Munsil, J.D., 1988, Arizona State University, who is clerking for CDL, and who used his skills
as editor of his university and law school newspapers to edit this work and conform its
style to proper form. I also thank the staff of the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform for its patience, help, and for the wonderful opportunity to participate in this
symposium.
1. See Pornography: A Poll, TIME, July 21, 1986, at 22 [hereinafter TIME Poll]; Poll:
Mixed Feelings on Pornography, NEWSWEEK Mar. 18, 1985, at 60; The Gallup Poll, Aug.
14, 1986; The Gallup Poll, Apr. 3, 1977. For a legal definition of obscenity, see infra text
accompanying note 27.
2. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) ("This much has been categorically
settled by the Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment.")
(citations omitted). See also Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 705 (1986); Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 571-72 (1942).
3. 1 A'l"l'ORNEY GENERAL'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., FINAL REPORT 367 (1986) [hereinafter COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY].
4. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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Part III examines the problems in applying Miller that suggest
that the application of a per se hard-core pornography rule may
be appropriate. Finally, Part IV presents a proposal for a per se
hard-core pornography rule, similar to child pornography laws
existing in many jurisdictions and upheld by the Supreme Court
in New York v. Ferber." This Article concludes that Congress
and the state legislatures should adopt an objective definition of
obscenity that would make commercial distribution of all hardcore pornography per se illegal. Such laws would remove most of
the confusion regarding what material is legal or illegal, providing a clear definitional line for producers and merchants. Prosecution of violators would become more frequent and efficient.
Eventually, the bulk of the illegal pornography industry's prostitution-based trade 8 would become unmarketable, and, like child
pornography, retreat into an underground culture far from the
general public.

l.

THE PROLIFERATION OF ILLEGAL HARD-CORE PORNOGRAPHY

Prosecutors and lawyers, including the author, who are experienced in obscenity cases, have witnessed many changes in the
past fifteen years. In the mid 1970's, when a judge informed a
panel of prospective jurors that the case involved obscenity,
many immediately thought of Penthouse, Hustler, and other
men's magazines sold at convenience stores and on newsstands.
Few had been exposed to hard-core pornography, which shows
things they had only heard about-explicit photographs of actual sex acts, including everything from blood, to goats, to
groups. Many female jurors did not want to see such hard-core
pornography and were excused as unable to be fair and impartial. If the name of the movie or magazine suggested homosexuality, many men also did not want to see the material.
Despite walkouts by potential jurors who were qualified but
did not wish to view the evidence, the jurors who did serve usually voted to convict. Though most people had seen Playboy and
some nudity and simulated sex in R-rated movies, the explicit
material that could only be obtained at "dirty" bookstores or
viewed at "adult" theatres still met with universal disapproval
5. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
6. The production of explicit pornography normally involves prostitution-like payment of money for sexual performances, as discussed infra in Part IV. See infra notes
140-41.
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in courts of law. Those cities that actively prosecuted obscenity
cases obtained convictions in almost every trial in which they
managed to get a jury verdict. 7 Several convictions were obtained in state and federal courts in California. 8 Then, a series of
acquittals and hung juries in the Los Angeles area in 1976 and
1977 prompted prosecutors there to abandon enforcement except for violent, animal, and child pornography cases. 9 That surrender in Los Angeles, along with lack of enforcement in New
York City, contributed greatly to the growth in the availability
of hard-core pornography in America, because the pornography
syndicate produces almost all hard-core films, videos, and
magazines in those cities. 10 This substantial industry provides
soft, medium, and hard-core pornography to cable, subscription,
and satellite television services; dial-porn telephone services;
convenience stores; "adult" bookstores and theatres; mail-order
services; and now video stores. A majority of Americans now
have been exposed to some form of pornography. 11 .Currently, a
panel of prospective jurors is likely to include several members
who have seen hard-core, X-rated material, probably from
videocassette rentals. 12 Prosecutors now expect to have several
"conservative" and "religious" people excused and to have a few
people serve on the trial jury who have been customers or viewers. The criminal trial juries of the 1980's are judging material
they have seen in their private lives, whereas juries in the 1960's
7. For example, Cincinnati, Buffalo, Atlanta, Boston, Norfolk, Arlington, Houston,
Omaha, and Cleveland, along with many cities in states including Florida, Illinois, Texas,
the Carolinas, Colorado, Washington, Utah, New York, Indiana, Kentucky, and Michigan
have enjoyed great success in eliminating pornography from their communities. See infra
note 13.
8. Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293 (1978); Splawn v. California, 431 U.S. 595
(1977); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115
(1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
9. Interview by author with Stephen Trott, then U.S. Attorney for the Central District of California and former Deputy District Attorney for Los Angeles County (March
26, 1984). Mr. Trott was a distinguished trial prosecutor, became Associate Attorney
General of the United States, and has been appointed by President Reagan to the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
10. In 1986, the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography reported that at
least 80% of hard-core tapes, films, and devices are produced in Los Angeles County. 2
CoMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 3, at 1366. The Commission also reported that up
to 90% of the pornography industry is controlled by organized crime families. Id. at
1048-49 (statement of Daryl F. Gates, Chief of Los Angeles Police Dep't). The control of
these families has historically been in New York City. See generally id. at 1037-1238
(chapter on organized crime). The "pornography syndicate" is a law enforcement trade
term for the collection of producers, directors, performers, and distributors who make
and market hard-core, explicit films and magazines.
11. TIME Poll, supra note 1.
12. Id.
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and 1970's were judging material they had never seen before.
Nevertheless, based upon this author's experience, convictions
are obtained in approximately seventy to ninety percent of the
cases currently tried. 13
Hard-core pornography has permeated local communities to
the extent that now many cities and counties have some sort of
traffic in such magazines or videos. 14 In the early 1970's, hardcore material was available only in the "adult" bookstores and
theatres in the downtowns of America's largest cities. 16 By the
late 1970's, these pornography outlets were in most large metropolitan areas. 16 In the last five years, hard-core films on video
cassettes have become available in a majority of the otherwise
legitimate video stores and chains in the United States. 17 For the
first time, the pornography syndicate can distribute its products
without owning the retail outlets. The businesspersons who own
video stores are not the syndicate-controlled people found in
13. No figures have been compiled on the total percentage of convictions obtained in
obscenity proceedings. This approximation by the author is based on 15 years of obscenity law enforcement experience. As Assistant Prosecutor in Cleveland, the author obtained more than 400 convictions for pandering obscenity and authored over 100 appeal
briefs in obscenity cases. A2J General Counsel with Citizens for Decency Through Law,
the author for 10 years has travelled the country conducting workshops for police and
prosecutors on the prosecution of obscenity and has assisted in dozens of obscenity trials
and appeals throughout the United States. In all, this author has tried over 65 obscenity
jury cases in several states and has argued over 50 appeals before the Ohio Court of
Appeals, the Ohio and Colorado Supreme Courts, United States Courts of Appeals for
the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, and the United States Supreme Court. See Flynt v. Ohio,
451 U.S. 619 (1981), dismissing cert. after oral argument in State v. Flynt, 63 Ohio St.
2d 132, 407 N.E.2d 15 (1980); Turoso v. Cleveland Mun. Court, 674 F.2d 486 (6th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Sovereign News Co. v. Falke, 674 F.2d 484 (6th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 864 (1982); People v. New Horizons, Inc., 200 Colo. 377,
616 P.2d 106 (1980); State v. Burgun, 56 Ohio St. 2d 354, 384 N.E.2d 255 (1978). This
firsthand experience puts the author in a unique position to comment on the success of
obscenity prosecutions nationwide. For a discussion of the effect of Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1973), on the number of obscenity prosecutions, see Project, An Empirical
Inquiry into the Effects of Miller v. California on the Control of Obscenity, 52 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 810 (1977).
14. See The Pornography Industry, Boston Globe, Feb. 13-18, 1983.
15. See COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY & PORNOGRAPHY, THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 7-21 (1970) [hereinafter OBSCENITY REPORT].
16. The Pornography Industry, supra note 14. Compare OBSCENITY REPORT, supra
note 15, at 7-21 with 1 COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 3, at 277.
"In sixteen years there have been numerous changes in the social, political, legal,
cultural, and religious portrait of the United States, and many of these changes
have undeniably involved both sexuality and the public portrayal of sexuality.
With reference to the question of pornography, therefore, there can be no doubt
that we confront a different world than that confronted by the 1970
Commission.
1 COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 3, at 226.
17. The Pornography Industry, supra note 14.
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"adult" bookstores and theatres. Video store owners sell the
same illegal product as "adult" bookstores and theatre owners
sell, however, and therefore video store owners must be prosecuted. But "Mom and Pop" video store owners and employees
have a better public image and are more sympathetic defendants. They present a different trial problem for prosecutors than
"adult" bookstore employees, whom the public generally perceives as sleazy. Law enforcement efforts must, however, continue to focus on the obscene material itself, rather than on the
salespersons.
Today's "adult" videos are the same hard-core films previously available only in the industry's own bookstores and theatres. As the Supreme Court stated in Miller v. California, what
was euphemistically called "adult" material in that case included magazines and a film "very explicitly depicting men and
women in groups of two or more engaging in a variety of sexual
activities, with genitals often prominently displayed.ms The
materials at issue in Orange County, California, in the Miller
case were examples of hard-core pornography that state and federal courts historically have condemned as obscene and unprotected by the first amendment. This same hard-core pornography is what is usually meant by the marketing term "adult."
Because obscenity enforcement has never been consistent
enough to force the pornography syndicates out of business or
back underground, video dealers are misled into believing, or at
least acting as if they believe, that the hard-core "adult" business is legal. The Attorney General's Commission on Pornography in 1986 criticized both federal and local prosecutors for letting the problem get out of control and urged local and federal
enforcement as the legal solution to the problem of hard-core
pornography. 19 If United States Attorneys and state and local
prosecutors bring strong cases under present laws, the entire
hard-core "adult" industry will be shown to be regularly engaged
in illegal traffic in obscenity.
The Supreme Court consistently and forcefully has repeated
that the "crass commercial exploitation of sex"20 is a matter of
grave concern and a legitimate target of state and federal criminal and civil laws and treaties. 21 In Paris Adult Theatre Iv. Slaton, 22 the Court set out its rebuttal to the industry's argument
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18 (1973).
1 COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 3, at 366-75.
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973).
Miller, 413 U.S. at 18-19.
413 U.S. 49 (1973).
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that sexually explicit material should not be regulated for consenting adults without empirical proof of conclusive harm. The
Court pointed out that "the primary requirements of decency
may be enforced against obscene publications"23 and that there
is "at least an arguable correlation between obscene material
and crime."24 The Court ruled that "legitimate state interests"
were at stake in slowing the tide of commercialized obscenity:
"Rights and interests 'other than those of the advocates are involved.' These include the interest of the public in the quality of
life and the total community environment, the tone of commerce
in the great city centers, and, possibly, the public safety itself."211

II.

THE CURRENT LEGAL STANDARD FOR OBSCENITY

The relative uniformity of federal and state obscenity statutes
provides an advantage to law enforcement officials. In Miller,
the Court formulated a test designed to provide "concrete guidelines to isolate 'hard-core' pornography from expression protected by the First Amendment" in an "attempt to provide positive guidance to federal and state courts alike." 26 Miller held
that material is obscene and unprotected by the first amendment if all three of the following conditions are met:
a) ... "the average person, applying contemporary community standards," would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest; b) ... the work
depicts or describes, in a patently o:ffensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law;
and c) ... the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 27
In Miller, the Court revised the old "Roth-Memoirs" test, 28
removing the obligation of prosecutors "to prove a negative, i.e.,
23. Id. at 57 (quoting Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 440 (1957)).
24. Id. at 58.
25. Id. (citation omitted).
26. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 29 (1973).
27. Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
28. In 1957, the Court first set forth the test for obscenity as "whether to the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
489 (1957). In 1966, the Court added to the Roth test and extended the greatest protection ever to sexually explicit material by forcing the prosecution to prove that material is
"utterly without redeeming social value." A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a
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that the material was 'utterly without redeeming social
value'-a burden virtually impossible to discharge under our
criminal standards of proof. " 29 The majority of the Court in
Miller reached agreement on a test for obscenity for the first
time since 1957, and in departing from Memoirs, the Court
reembraced Roth. 30
On the same day the Supreme Court decided Miller, the
Court held that the Miller test would be applied to federal, as
well as state, legislation. 31 One year later, in Hamling v. United
States, the Court upheld and construed the federal mailing statute "to be limited to material such as that described in
Miller. " 32 In 1978, the Court noted that its construction of the
mailing statute in Hamling was a "holding that the statute's
coverage is limited to obscenity," 83 even though the broadcast
statute at issue in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation was not limited
to the "obscene" and retained a separate prohibition against
"indecency" (the second prong of the Miller test). 34 The Court
has made clear in other cases that Miller's guidelines apply to
all federal laws except broadcast and telephone indecency. 311
The response of the states was far more tortured. Because federal courts cannot authoritatively construe state legislation, 36 the
Supreme Court in Miller explicitly invited state courts .to interpret and save existing pre-Miller laws by engrafting the Miller
test onto the statutes, rather than striking down the statutes
and requiring the enactment of the Miller test by legislation. 37
Following Miller, the states either construed their statutes to
Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966) (emphasis in
original).
29. Miller, 413 U.S. at 22; see also Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 116 (1974).
30. Miller, 413 U.S. at 29, 36; Memoirs, 383 U.S. 413; see Roth, 354 U.S. 476; see also
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 192-94 (1977).
31. United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 129-30
(1973).
32. 418 U.S. 87, 115 (1974).
33. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 740 (1978).
34. Id., at 740-41, 743.
35. See Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293 (1978); Smith v. United States, 431
U.S. 291 (1977); Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977); United States v. Orito, 413
U.S. 139 (1973).
36. United States v. Thirty-seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971) ("We
lack jurisdiction authoritatively to construe state legislation."); United States v. 12 200Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 130 n.7 (1973).
37. "If a state law that regulates obscene material is thus limited, as written or construed, the First Amendment values applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment are adequately protected by the ultimate power of appellate courts to conduct an independent review of constitutional claims when necessary." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973).
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adopt all or most of Miller or declared them invalid and left
revision to the legislatures.as The process has been continuing
since 1973, but at present all state obscenity laws have the
Miller test in effect. 89
In Miller, the Supreme Court announced for the first time a
definitive test for determining obscenity and gave "a few plain
examples" of the type of hard-core sexual conduct that can be
found patently offensive under state and federal law. 40 This test
has not changed. The only significant further explanation of the
test is found in Smith v. United States.•• In that case, the Court
clarified that patent offensiveness and prurient appeal were
questions of fact to be determined by the hypothetical average
person applying contemporary community standards.43 Pope v.
Illinois 48 verified what was implicit after Smith-that the third
prong of the Miller test (whether the material has serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value) is to be judged according to the reasonable person standard, rather than by contemporary community standards.••
Although the test for obscenity has not changed, a number of
United States Supreme Court and lower court cases have fleshed
out the meaning of various words and phrases used by the
Miller Court. A detailed discussion of the terms used in the
Miller test is necessary to an understanding of the current legal
standard for obscenity. Readers should be mindful, however,
that definitions and jury instructions vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. The following definitions are adapted from and supported by decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
38. See Taylor, Pornography and the First Amendment, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 156-57 (1983).
39. Only Vermont and Alaska have no adult obscenity statutes of any kind. Maine,
New Mexico, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Montana allow local obscenity ordinances. See, e.g., City of Portland v. Jacobsky, 496 A.2d 646, 648 (Me. 1985); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 30-38-2 (1978); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-24-27 (10) (1988); W. VA. CODE
§ 7-1-4(4) (1984); MoNT. CODE ANN.§ 45-8-201 (1985). Obscenity statutes in Oregon and
Hawaii were struck down on state constitutional grounds. In State v. Henry, 302 Or. 510,
732 P.2d 9 (1987), the Oregon Supreme Court ruled that obscenity is protected speech
under the Oregon Constitution. In State v. Kam, 748 P.2d 372 (1988), the Hawaii Supreme Court held Hawaii's obscenity laws violative of the right to privacy created by the
state constitution.
40. Miller, 413 U.S. at 25.
41. 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
42. Id. at 301-02, 309.
43. 107 S.Ct. 1918 (1987).
44. Id. at 1919.
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The Average Person

Smith made clear that prurient appeal and patent offensiveness were to be judged by the average person applying "contemporary community standards."' 11 In Pinkus v. United States, the
Court explained that the jury's duty was to "determine the collective view of the community, as best as it can be done. " 46 The
Court also held that it was the adult community that was to be
considered." Many cases have held that obscenity is not to be
determined only by its effect on a "sensitive," "insensitive,"
"prudish," or "tolerant" person but also by its effect on the "average" person who represents the synthesis of the entire adult
community. 48
B.

Contemporary Community Standards

In an obscenity trial, the United States Supreme Court requires the fact-finder to determine whether the average person
would consider certain material prurient and patently offensive,
using contemporary community standards as the measuring
stick. As stated in Smith, "community standards simply provide
the measure against which the jury decides the questions of appeal to prurient interest and patent offensiveness. " 49 A juror is
allowed to draw on personal knowledge of the views of the average person in the juror's own community, "just as he is entitled
to draw on his knowledge of the propensities of a 'reasonable'
person in other areas of the law."l!O
That the geographical area comprising the community need
not be national, or even statewide, is evident. The preferred area
is that from which the jury is drawn, in order to allow jurors as
much freedom from confusion as possible. Miller sought to minimize the jury's need to deal with an abstract formulation, by
allowing less than a national standard. 111 As explained in Hamling: "Our holding in Miller that California could constitution45. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 293, 302 (1978).
46. 436 U.S. 293, 301 (1978).
47. Id. at 298-300.
48. See id. at 303 (1977); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30, 33 (1973); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489-90 (1957); see also F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY
69-77 (1976).
49. 431 U.S. at 302.
50. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-05 (1974).
51. Miller, 413 U.S. at 30-32.

264

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 21:l & 2

ally proscribe obscenity in terms of a 'statewide' standard did
not mean that any such precise geographic area is required as a
matter of constitutional law."H
In Jenkins v. Georgia,r.a the Court approved a charge that did
not specify any geographical size for the community, noting that
"the States have considerable latitude in framing statutes under
this element of the Miller decision. " 114 The Court held that statutes that define "community" as a precise geographic area are
just as valid as those that define "community" as statewide and
those that do not define community at all. 1111 In Hamling, however, the Court suggested that the best approach is to use the
area the jury is drawn from as the geographical "community."G6
The Court also held that using the local vicinage as the relevant
community would not preclude the jury from receiving relevant
evidence on standards statewide or in other parts of the country.G7 Pinkus provided that children are not to be considered
part of the "community" when applying contemporary standards and that "the community includes all adults who constitute it, and a jury can consider them all in determining relevant
community standards."H
C.

Expert Testimony

In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton/ 9 the Court held that once
the allegedly obscene material is placed in evidence, the jury can
decide all facets of the test based on its own knowledge, without
the need for expert testimony. The Court ruled it was not error
"to fail to require 'expert' affirmative evidence that the materials were obscene when the materials themselves were actually
placed in evidence. The films, obviously, are the best evidence of
what they represent." 60 The Court in Kaplan v. California61
stated that there was no "constitutional need for 'expert' testimony on beha!f of the prosecution, or for any other ancillary evi52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

418 U.S. at 105.
418 U.S. 153 (1974).
Id. at 157.
Id.
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 105-06 (1974).
Id. at 105-06.
Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 298, 300 (1978).
413 U.S. 49 (1973).
Id. at 56 (citations omitted).
413 U.S. 115 (1973).
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dence of obscenity, once the allegedly obscene material itself is
placed in evidence. " 82
Limitations on the admissibility of evidence lie in the broad
discretion of the trial court. In Hamling v. United States, 63 the
Court upheld rulings excluding comparables (similar sexually explicit material available nearby), expert witnesses, and other
evidence.

D. Appeal to Prurient Interest
The Model Penal Code definition approved by the Court in
Roth v. United States defines "prurient interest" in part as a
"shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion."" The
Court referred to obscene material as that "which deals with sex
in a manner appealing to prurient interest, " 85 meaning "material
having tendency to excite lustful thoughts. 1188 The Court also
saw "no significant difference between the meaning of obscenity
developed in the case law and the definition of the A.L.I. Model
Penal Code."87 In Mishkin, 68 Hamling, 69 and Pinkus, 70 the Court
made clear that when material is intended to stimulate a specific
deviant group or a specific deviant sexual interest, the prurient
interest test is satisfied if jurors find that the material appeals to
the prurient interest of the intended and probable deviant
group.
In Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 71 the Court
made a general observation about the appeal of pornography to
normal persons, which was cited with approval in footnote
twenty of Roth:12 "They take 'their attraction from the general
interest, eager and wholesome it may be, in their subjects, but a
prurient interest may be excited and appealed to. ' 173 In a later
62.
63.
64.
Draft
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 121.
418 U.S. 87, 124-27 (1974).
354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957) (quoting Model Penal Code § 207.10(2) (Tentative
No. 6 1957)).
Id. at 487.
Id. at 487 n.20.
Id.
Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508 (1966).
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 127-30 (1974).
Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 301-03 (1978).
236 U.S. 230 (1915).
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957).
Mutual Film, 236 U.S. at 242.
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case, the Court characterized this trait as "the widespread weakness for titillation by pornography.""
The Supreme Court has used various descriptive words to define "prurient." Material can be prurient when it either attracts
or repulses. 711 Material that may be attractive or erotic, even to
the average person, has been held to be obscene. 76 Bizarre material, repulsive to the average person, also has been found obscene. 77 Prurient appeal is properly a synthesis of all the considerations that describe an interest in sex for its own sake or for
commercial gain. 78
The Court has chosen its wording carefully to avoid the
problems of the old "Hicklin Rule,"79 which judged obscenity
solely by its impact on the young or sensitive. In Miller, the
Court stated that the guideline is "whether 'the average person,
applying contemporary community standards' would find that
the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest."80
In Roth, the Court asked "whether to the averag~ person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of
the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."81 In
Miller, the Court also said that "triers of fact are asked to decide whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would consider certain materials
'prurient.' " 82
The Court in Miller did not say that the fact-finder was to
decide whether the matter appealed only to the shameful or
morbid interest of an average person applying contemporary
74. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 471 (1966).
75. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508-(1966); see also Roth, 354 U.S. 476 (quoting Schwartz, Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 CoLUM. L. REV. 669, 677
(1963)).
76. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1984); Ginzburg, 383 U.S. 463; see also
Penthouse Int'l v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Obscene
Printed Matter, 668 F. Supp. 50 (D. Mass. 1987); Penthouse Int'l v. Webb, 594 F. Supp.
1186 (N.D. Ga. 1984); United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, 536 F.
Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); State v. Triplett, 722 S.W.2d 633 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Flynt v.
State, 153 Ga. App. 232, 264 S.E.2d 669 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980); City of
Belleville v. Morgan, 60 Ill. App. 3d 434, 376 N.E.2d 704 (1978).
77. Ward v. lllinois, 431 U.S. 767 (1977); Mishkin, 383 U.S. at 502, 505; United States
v. Guglielmi, 819 F.2d 451 (4th Cir. 1987).
78. See F. SCHAUER, supra note 48, at 96-102; MODEL PENAL CODE§ 251.4 commentaries at 488-94 (Official Code and Revised Comments 1980).
79. The "Hicklin Rule" is derived from the English case of Regina v. Hicklin, 3 L.R.Q.B. 360 (1868), in which the test for obscenity was "whether the tendency of the matter
charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall."
80. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (emphasis added).
81. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957) (emphasis added).
82. 413 U.S. at 30 (emphasis added).
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community standards. Rather, it required the fact-finder to determine whether the average person, applying those standards,
would find the appeal directed to the prurient interest. This
subtle distinction is important. If a judge charges a jury that it
must find the material obscene only if the material appeals to or
excites a shameful or morbid interest in an average person or in
the jury, confusion can result, and the purpose of obscenity
law-to distinguish illegal from protected material-would be
thwarted. 88

E.

Serious Value and Pandering

Pope v. Illinois verified that the third prong of the Miller test
is to be judged by the reasonable person standard, rather than
by contemporary community standards, and held that the issue
of whether the material has serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value is not limited to the individual community, but is
based on an objective standard. 84 The judge and jury can still
use their own "knowledge of the propensities of a 'reasonable'
person" to determine objective value without reference to the
community, and without the need for expert testimony, as they
do to determine prurience and offensiveness within the reference
of community standards. 811
Whether the material is promoted or "pandered" as sexually
explicit material is relevant to the determination of whether the
material has serious value. The Court referred to this as "the
sordid business of pandering-'the business of purveying textual
or graphic matter openly advertised to appeal to the erotic interest of their customers.' "88 The Court has ruled that "evidence of
pandering to prurient interests in the creation, promotion, or
dissemination of material is relevant in determining whether the
material is obscene.''87 Evidence of pandering can be used to rebut allegations that the material has serious value. 88
83. United States v. Guglielmi, 819 F.2d 451, 455 (4th Cir. 1987); Fahringer, The
Defense of an Obscenity ·Prosecution, TRIAL, May 1978, at 32.
84. 107 S. Ct. 1918 (1987).
85. See also Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 301 (1977); F. SCHAUER, supra note
48, at 123-24.
86. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 467-68 (1966) (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at
495-96 (Warren, C.J., concurring)).
87. Splawn v. California, 431 U.S. 595, 598 (1977).
88. Id.; see also Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 303-04 (1978); Hamling v.
United States, 418 U.S. 87, 130 (1974).
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Patently Offensive Sexual Conduct

In Miller, the Court offered examples of the type of "sexual
conduct" that needed to be defined by state statute, making
clear that states were not limited to those examples. 89 The Court
stated that it was not limiting the states but only offering examples. In Ward v. Illinois, 90 the Court approved the inclusion of
bestiality and sadomasochism as examples of sexual conduct in a
state statute. The Court held that notice was provided by the
descriptions of flagellation, homosexuality, oral contact, and intercourse included in Illinois law by the Illinois Supreme
Court. 91
The concept of patent offensiveness can be found in the definition of obscene in the Model Penal Code as "substantially beyond customary limits of candor in describing or representing
such matters,"92 a definition based on Judge Learned Hand's
definition of "obscene" in United States v. Kennerly. 93 This language later reappeared in Justice Brennan's opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 94 which also approved of Justice Harlan's statement
that, to be "patently offensive" or "indecent," materials should
be "so offensive on their face as to affront current community
standards of decency."911 Justice Brennan referred to this as "a
deviation from society's standards of decency."96
Whether material is "patently offensive" to contemporary
community standards should be determined by what is "accepted" in that community, not what is merely "tolerated." In
Smith v. United States, the Court affirmed a conviction and approved the jury instruction "that contemporary community
standards were set by what is in fact accepted in the community
as a whole."97 In Miller, the Court stated that "[i]t is neither
realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment
as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New
York City."98
89. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973).
90. 431 U.S. 767, 773 (1977).
91. Id. at 771-73.
92. MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.4 commentaries at 492 (Official Code and Revised
Comments 1980); see also F. SCHAUER, supra note 48, at 102-05.
93. 209 F. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
94. 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
95. Manual Enters. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 482 (1962).
96. Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 192.
97. 431 U.S. 291, 297-98 (1977) (emphasis added).
98. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 32 (1973) (emphasis added).
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The Court has employed this concept of community acceptance in its decisions on patent offensiveness since Roth. 99 Most
recently, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the Court held that the
normal definition of "indecent" referred to "nonconformance
with accepted standards of morality."1°0 The Court also noted
that Justice Harlan used "indecency" as a shorthand term for
"patent offensiveness" and that the FCC similarly defined "indecent" in the case before it. 101
In Sedelbauer v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court approved
the use of the word "acceptance" in the application of community standards to patent offensiveness, ruling that "the trial
court did not err in using the word 'accept' in giving instructions
to the jury rather than the word 'tolerate' as requested by the
defendant. " 102 Courts also have disallowed or restricted the use
of "comparables" as evidence that community standards of patent offensiveness have not been violated, unless a proper foundation showing similarity and acceptance is met. 103 The Court,
in Hamling, followed the Second Circuit's decision that "[m]ere
availability of similar material by itself means nothing more
than that other persons are engaged in similar activities." 10•
III.

THE NEED FOR

A

PER SE HARD-CORE PORNOGRAPHY RULE

Several factors contribute to the inconsistency surrounding
the enforcement of obscenity laws in state and local jurisdictions. This inconsistency could be remedied by the adoption of a
per se rule mandating that all commercial hard-core pornography be recognized as illegal.
First, state court interpretations of their obscenity laws will
generally be upheld by the United States Supreme Court, which
99. See Smith, 431 U.S. 291; Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973);
Miller, 413 U.S. 15; A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure"
v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
100. 438 U.S. 726, 740 (1978).
101. Id. at 740 n.15.
102. Sedelbauer v. State, 428 N.E.2d 206, 211 (Ind. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1035
(1982).
103. See United States v. Battista, 646 F.2d 237, 245 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1046 (1981); United States v. Womack, 509 F.2d 368, 375-81 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1022 (1975); Womack v. United States, 294 F.2d 204, 206 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 859 (1961); Flynt v. State, 154 Ga. App. 232, 264 S.E.2d 669, 673-78,
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980); Long v. 130 Market Street Gift & Novelty, 294 Pa.
Super. 383, 440 A.2d 517, 521 (1982).
104. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 126 (quoting United States v. Manarite,
448 F.2d 583, 593 (2d Cir. 1971)).
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considers itself, and all federal courts, "bound" by such interpretations.1011 Federal courts can only declare state laws valid or invalid and declare whether any invalid provision or interpretation
is severable. 108 Thus, state courts retain control to construe and
enforce state laws. 107
Second, differences in penalty schemes in various jurisdictions, 108 and the availability of several possible causes of action
(i.e., criminal, civil nuisance, injunction, declaratory judgment,
racketeering, and organized crime) 109 pose further complications.
These choices create variations in the effectiveness of prosecutions from state to state.
Despite these two problems, if an obscenity case is tried in
any of the ninety-four federal districts or within the forty-six
states with active statutes or ordinances,110 the same basic
guidelines are used to determine obscenity. Nevertheless, the issues become substantially confused because jury instructions
differ dramatically in their explanation of the terms used in the
Miller test, as can the definitions used by trial judges. State
courts, as well as federal courts, retain wide latitude in defining
legal terms and drafting jury instructions. This effectively
changes application of the law from jurisdiction to jurisdiction
105. See Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 772-73 (1977); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S.
502, 507-08, 510-11 (1966); Kingsley Int'l Pictures v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688 (1959);
see also Guaranty Trust v. Blodgett, 287 U.S. 509, 513 (1933) (accepting state court interpretation of tax law as binding on Supreme Court).
106. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985); Metromedia, Inc. v.
San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 521 n.26 (1981); United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491 (1965); see
also McCarthy v. Briscoe, 553 F.2d 1005, 1007 (5th Cir. 1977).
107. See Turoso v. Cleveland Mun. Court, 674 F.2d 486 (6th Cir. 1982); Sovereign
News Co. v. Falke, 674 F.2d 484 (6th Cir. 1982); Sovereign News Co. v. Falke, 448 F.
Supp. 306 (N.D. Ohio 1977); State v. Burgun, 56 Ohio St. 2d 354, 384 N.E.2d 255 (1978);
see also Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 339-40, 343-46 (1975); Miller v. California, 418
U.S. 915 (1974) (Miller II); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (Miller I); Hoover v.
Byrd, 801 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1986); Red Bluff Drive-Inv. Vance, 648 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir.
1981); People v. Geever, 122 Ill. 2d 313, 522 N.E.2d 1200 (1988); Andrews v. State, 652
S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); People v. Enskat, 33 Cal. App. 3d 900, 109 Cal. Rptr.
433 (1973).
108. E.g., Polykoff v. Collins, 816 F.2d 1326, 1337-40 (9th Cir. 1987) (upholding Arizona's felony fine provision for up to $1 million); 511 Detroit Street, Inc. v. Kelley, 807
F.2d 1293, 1298-99 (6th Cir. 1986) (upholding Michigan's felony fine provision for up to
$5 million).
109. E.g., United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1982) (criminal RICO);
State v. Anderson, 322 N.C. 22, 366 S.E.2d 459 (1988) (criminal); 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, 504 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. 1987) (Indiana RICO); State ex rel. Kidwell v. U.S. Marketing, Inc., 102 Idaho 451, 631 P.2d 622 (1981), app. dismissed, 455 U.S. 1009 (1982) (civil
nuisance); People ex rel. Gow v. Mitchell Brothers' Santa Ana Theater, 101 Cal. App. 3d
296, 161 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1980) (civil injunction).
110. See supra note 39.
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and proves a hindrance to law enforcement. The Miller test is
fairly simple to state and debate. However, after the judge adds
several pages of explanations as to what "average person," "contemporary community standards," "prurient," "patently offensive," and "serious value" mean, the prosecutor's argument and
the trier of fact's decision become much more difficult.
This morass of conflicting definitions can discourage prosecutors from bringing obscenity cases to trial and can confuse jurors, causing deadlocked and hung juries, and acquittals on material that is clearly obscene. m The United States Supreme
Court should end this confusion by ruling on a comprehensive
series of issues to clarify how the test should be applied and how
the terms in Miller should be read.
Congress and the states could help the public and the courts
by passing supplementary statutes that prohibit illegal material
in an objective, per se manner. 112 Such an approach would provide at least one major degree of uniformity to complement the
application of the obscenity test. A simple prohibition of hardcore pornography would provide a benchmark by which to slow
commercial trafficking in human flesh-at least by removing
filmed acts of prostitution. Filmed or photographed acts of actual sexual intercourse would be prohibited, but simulations or
suggestions of sex would not be outlawed by the per se rule. The
existing Miller laws could be used, along with the pandering
rule, 113 to prosecute or enjoin simulated depictions of sex that
are still considered obscene because of their prurient appeal, offensiveness, and lack of serious value. Where films or photos visibly display penetration, however, their commercial distribution
would be forbidden.
The Attorney General's Commission resisted recommending a
per se approach, favoring instead the full enforcement of existing, tested laws. 114 The Commission was correct in holding
that Miller is enforceable, but the Commission's frustration with
lack of enforcement is the very problem addressed by a more
limited rule than Miller for films or photographs of actual sex
acts that are nothing more than filmed or photographed acts of
prostitution. This per se proposal would not conflict with Miller
111. J CoMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 3, at 460; Project, supra note 10, at 89596, 910-28.
112. This writer first proposed a per se definition of obscenity in 1983. Taylor, supra
note 38. See also Milligan, Obscenity: Malum in Se or Only in Context? The Supreme
Court's Long Ordeal, 7 CAP. U.L. REV. 631, 643-45 (1978).
113. Taylor, supra note 38, at 159.
114. 1 COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 3, at 364-66.
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because the proposal would reach less material than the Miller
test, but it would make prosecution easier for the material
Miller always reaches-the hardest of hard-core pornography:
actual intercourse or ejaculation occurring in front of a camera
for commercial exploitation.
IV.

THE HARD-CORE PORNOGRAPHY RULE

The proposed new statute or ordinance should be simple and
could read:
No person with knowledge of the character of the material shall knowingly distribute or exhibit, to the public
or for commercial purposes, any hard-core pornography.
Hard-core pornography means any material or performance that explicitly depicts ultimate sexual acts, including vaginal or anal intercourse, fellatio, cunnilingus,
analingus, and masturbation, where penetration, manipulation, or ejaculation of the genitals is clearly visible.
Congress and state legislatures should make the statute applicable to importation, interstate shipment, mailing, public dissemination, and commercial distribution. The law should also
provide an affirmative defense for bona fide scientific, educational, or research purposes, and/or provide an exception for serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific uses. Under such a
scheme, only the commercial pandering of explicit sex would be
prohibited.
As used by the Supreme Court and lower courts since 1957,
the phrase "hard-core pornography" has become as much a legal
term of art as the word "obscene." 1 u Unlike obscenity, however,
the definition of hard-core pornography has not changed over
the years. It has always referred to visual materials that show
explicit sexual acts. The trade term for hard-core pornography is
PCV-"penetration clearly visible." The Supreme Court has historically struggled with developing a test for obscenity, but the
majority has always seemed to agree on the illegality of "hardcore pornography."116 The Miller test, like the Roth test, allows
115. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 118 (1974). "[T]he word 'obscene'
... is not merely a generic or descriptive term, but a legal term of art." Id.
116. In announcing the obscenity test, Chief Justice Burger wrote: "Under the holdings announced today, no one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of
obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe patently offensive 'hard core'
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material to he found obscene even if it is not hard-core pornography, because the sex may he "simulated."
In Roth, the materials arguably were not hard-core pornography117 because they were not explicit. Justice Harlan, in his concurrence in the companion state case to Roth, Alberts v. California, argued that the state conviction should be upheld because
states should have more freedom to regulate pornographic
materials. 118 But Harlan thought Roth's federal case should be
dismissed, because the federal government should only be allowed to criminalize "hard-core pornography." 119 Justice Harlan
repeated this contention in 1962 when he argued that the federal
government should not be allowed to prohibit mailings of mere
nudity, which were not "hard-core."120
In 1966, a majority of the Court recognized that hard-core material is clearly obscene, but that the Roth test also reaches material that is not as explicit as hard-core pornography. In
Mishkin v. New York, the Court noted that New York's decision
to criminalize only hard-core pornography meant that its "definition of obscenity is more stringent than the Roth definition,"
reaching "a narrower class of conduct," and therefore, "the judgment that the constitutional criteria are satisfied is implicit in
the application of [New York's law].m 21
In Miller, the Court made clear that more than just hard-core
pornography could he outlawed, giving examples of material that
states could constitutionally prohibit, including "simulated" descriptions of sex acts and "lewd exhibition of the genitals,"122
neither of which constitutes hard-core pornography. Had the
Court followed Justice Harlan's view, it would have limited the
Miller test to actual depictions of ultimate sex acts. Such a limitation on law enforcement would have provided the federal government and states with little protection against the increasingly
explicit and deviant material turned out by the pornography industry. Much hard-core and obscene medium-core (simulated)
materials would have gone unprosecuted. Such a hard-core limitation would have departed from Roth and from the previously
discussed "pandering" concept, where materials that were not
sexual
Miller
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

conduct specifically defined by the regulating state law, as written or construed."
v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 27 (1973).
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
354 U.S. 476, 501-02 (Harlan, J., concurring).
354 U.S. 476, 507 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Manual Enters. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 489 (1962).
383 U.S. 506, 508 (1966).
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973).
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hard-core (and, the Court notes, may not have been "obscene"
standing alone) were held subject to conviction if the
pornographer pandered them as if they were obscene and highly
prurient. 123 The proposed hard-core rule would, therefore, be a
supplement to existing obscenity laws, not a replacement.
There is a difference between hard-core sexual conduct, as
used in Miller, and hard-core pornography. Hard-core conduct
refers to types of sex-ultimate sexual acts and lewd exhibitions
of the genitals-not to a type of material. Hard-core pornography refers to a way of depicting ultimate sexual acts, by explicitly depicting genital penetration or ejaculation. Hard-core conduct-the Miller examples-can be depicted in a hard-core way
(PCV), a medium-core way (simulated), or even a soft-core way
(posing of nudes with focus on genitals). These three kinds of
pornography can all be found obscene under Miller, 12• but only
if presented in a patently offensive way that appeals to the prurient interest and has no serious value. 1 n The proposed hardcore rule would apply only to hard-core conduct depicted in a
hard-core way-by penetration clearly visible.
The term "hard-core pornography," as used by the courts, includes actual and simulated sex and can even include written
descriptions of ultimate sex acts. By limiting the proposed per se
rule to that portion of hard-core pornography where penetration
is clearly visible, the vagueness of the Miller test is avoided
while the objectivity and constitutionality of this per se proposal
is strengthened. The other types of hard-core pornography that
depict simulated sex or describe graphic sex would be left to current obscenity laws under Miller, in order to allow for the application of the serious value and community standards tests.
Many researchers and much of the public agree that pornography involving children, violence (whether hard- or soft-core),
and other degrading or bizarre acts is harmful and causes or
contributes to antisocial and criminal behavior. 126 The United
123. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
124. See e.g., United States v. Battista, 646 F.2d 237 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1046 (1981) (holding obscene the hard-core film Deep Throat); Penthouse Int'l v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that lewd exhihition of the genitals in magazine pictorial met patent offensiveness test, and that Penthouse and Oui magazines were
therefore obscene); United States v. West Coast News, 357 F.2d 855, 857 (6th Cir. 1966)
(holding book titled Sex Life of a Cop "by any standard" to be obscene-"a writing so
bad that no amount of sophisticated dialectics could absolve it from classification as
'hard-core'"); State ex rel. Keating v. A Motion Picture Film Entitled "Vixen," 35 Ohio
St. 2d 251, 301 N.E.2d 880 (1973) (holding obscene a film with simulated sex scenes).
125. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24-25.
126. See generally CoMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 3.
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States Supreme Court, however, has never required obscenity
laws to be based on or limited by current research or the opinions of professors and doctors who may agree or disagree with
present law. 127 The Court has been steadfast in allowing Congress and state legislatures to define the crime of obscenity,
within the guidelines of the Miller test. 128
Obviously, simulated and normal sexual acts and lewd exhibition of the genitals (even without conduct) are not hard-core
pornography in the strict sense, even though they are types of
hard-core sexual activities (as opposed to mere nudity and fondling). Yet these can be found obscene under the Miller test. It
is implicit that if such hard-core types of sex are depicted in a
hard-core fashion, then the material is clearly illegal and can be
subject to criminal and civil penalties under federal and state
statutes.
Under the Miller test, for example, the Fifth Circuit found
issues of Penthouse and Oui magazines, but not Playboy, to be
obscene. 129 Under Ohio law, the simulated sex movie "Vixen"
was enjoined as obscene under the more restricted pre-Miller
standard of Roth, then reaffirmed as obscene by the Ohio Supreme Court after the Miller standards were announced. 180 The
court held that scenes of "purported acts of sexual intercourse"
exhibited for "commercial exploitation" were obscene and unprotected by the Constitution. 181
It is not open to debate that all explicit sexual material can be
found obscene, and that nonexplicit, simulated material also can
violate the Miller standards. That much the Supreme Court has
made clear. Whether the theme or context of the sex is violent,
consensual, degrading, or bizarre is an element only of how "patently offensive" the depiction is. For a finding of obscenity, the
Court in Miller did not require patently offensive sexual acts,
but rather sexual acts depicted in a patently offensive way.
Miller requires an average person, applying contemporary community standards, to find that the work depicts or describes sexual conduct (such as ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted,
actual or simulated; masturbation; excretory functions; or lewd
exhibition of the genitals) in a patently offensive way. 182 As
127. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60-64 (1973).
128. Id. at 64-69.
129. Penthouse Int'! v. McAulitfe, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1980).
130. State ex rel. Keating v. A Motion Picture Film Entitled "Vixen," 35 Ohio St. 2d
215, 301 N.E.2d 880 (1973).
131. Id. at 880, 882.
132. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973).
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made clear in Mishkin and in the cases sustained on appeal
since Miller, these materials can include the violent133 as well as
non-violent, 134 the simulated,1 36 and the so-called "soft-core" or
"medium-core. " 136
Admittedly, this proposal for a per se hard-core statute would
not reach to all the obscenity now prosecutable under present
Miller laws. This proposal would, however, include the material
that most of the individual Supreme Court Justices have agreed
is illegal. Even Justice Stewart, concurring in Memoirs as he had
dissented in Ginzburg, stated his view that "only hard-core pornography may be suppressed.>11 37 In Roth, the Court stated that
obscenity can be prosecuted without harming the first amendment's protection "to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for
the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people."138 But the Court added in Miller that "the public portrayal of hard-core sexual conduct for its own sake, and for the
ensuing commercial gain, is a different matter." 139 This Article's
hard-core proposal would take advantage of the clearest consensus in the field of obscenity law, and its implementation would
eliminate most obviously illegal material.
Because state and federal law can reach materials that are not
hard-core pornography, the courts have assumed that if the
materials are indeed hard-core, their obscenity is clear as a matter of law. An underlying reason for courts to treat hard-core
pornography as obscene per se is that its commercial production
necessarily involves prostitution. 14° Convictions have been obtained and nuisance actions sustained where producers of hardcore pornography were apprehended in California and New York
and charged with prostitution-related offenses. 141
133. See, e.g., State v. Riggins, 645 S.W.2d 113 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); State v. XNLT
Corp., 536 S.W.2d 836 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
134. United States v. Battista, 646 F.2d 237 (6th Cir. 1981); see also 2 CoMM'N ON
PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 3, at 1745-80 (listing films held obscene).
135. State ex rel. Keating v. A Motion Picture Film Entitled "Vixen," 35 Ohio St. 2d
215, 301 N.E.2d 880 (1973).
136. Penthouse Int'l v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1980).
137. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. at 193 (1977) (citing A Book Named "John
Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413, 421
(1966)).
138. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 476, 484 (1957).
139. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 35 (1973) (citing Roth, 354 U.S. at 496 (Warren,
C.J., concurring)).
140. State ex rel. Sensenbrenner v. Adult Book Store, 26 Ohio App. 2d 183, 213, 271
N.E.2d 13, 31 (1971), atf'd, 35 Ohio St. 2d 220, 301 N.E.2d 695 (1973), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 934 (1975).
141. See People ex rel. Van De Kamp v. American Art Enters., 124 Cal. App. 3d
1023, 177 Cal. Rptr. 776 (1981), vacated on other grounds, 33 Cal. 3d 328, 188 Cal. Rptr.
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In one obscenity case, an Ohio appellate court noted, "It is
highly improbable that some of the material herein involved
could be prepared without acts of prostitution or sodomy."H2
The court recognized that "[i]nherent in the publication of pictorial pornography is the commission of acts . . . which are abhorrent to our national society, and are prohibited by the laws of
almost all jurisdictions. mo
The Court in Mishkin inferred that if a state limits its obscenity laws to hard-core pornography, then a finding of illegality
under that rule automatically satisfies the "constitutional criteria" of the obscenity test. H• Like New York, the California Supreme Court limited the reach of its penal statute, holding that
"it is clear that Section 311 prohibits only 'hard-core pornography' ... and that '[t]o constitute obscenity ... the material
must contain a graphic description of sexual activity.' " 146
In 1968, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin discussed the "hardcore" versus Roth test in State v. Voshart, where it noted that
state laws must "stay within the bounds of the constitutional
criteria" and that there "appear to be two such definitions that
have been given United States Supreme Court approval.'' 148 The
court said that one "is the Roth test . . . capsulized in the
Memoirs case." 147 The court then added: "The alternative definition defines 'obscene' as meaning 'hard core pornography' ...
this definition . . . was held to meet the constitutional criteria"
in Mishkin v. New York. m The court held the materials "obscene under either the Roth test or hard core pornography test,"
but recognized the "hard-core rule" as "most clearly indicating
what may be considered obscene ... and that leaves the smallest room for disagreement," quoting Justice Harlan's dissent in
740, 656 P.2d 1170 (1983); People v. Souter, 125 Cal. App. 3d 563, 178 Cal. Rptr. 111
(1981); People v. Kovner, 96 Misc. 2d 414, 409 N.Y.S.2d 349 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1978); People ex rel. Van De Kamp v. American Art Enters., 75 Cal. App. 3d 523, 142 Cal. Rptr.
338 (1977); People v. Fixler, 56 Cal. App. 3d 321, 128 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1976). But see
People v. Freeman, No. 000070 (Cal. Sup. Ct., filed Aug. 25, 1988) (Westlaw, CA-CS file)
(finding that hard-core film production is pandering only when the state proves the performers acted for the purpose of "sexual arousal or gratification," and the film is legally
obscene).
142. Sensenbrenner, 26 Ohio App. 2d at 213, 271 N.E.2d at 31.
143. Id.
144. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508 (1966).
145. Bloom v. Municipal Court, 16 Cal. 3d 71, 79, 127 Cal. Rptr. 317, 322, 545 P.2d
229, 234 (1976) (citations omitted).
146. State v. Voshart, 39 Wis. 2d 419, 429, 159 N.W.2d 1, 6 (1968).
147. Id. at 429, 159 N.W.2d at 6.
148. Id. at 430, 159 N.W.2d at 7.
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Memoirs that court and others will "know . . when [they] see
it."149
The "hard-core rule" has been used often by courts as a shortcut for finding obscenity, as an Ohio trial court did in enjoining
the movie Deep Throat by finding that "this is hard core pornography and as such it can and does speak for itself. The Court
holds as a matter of law that this film is hard core pornography
and obscene . . . . m 11o
In 1971, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland asserted
that "in some instances the more traditional methods of proof
by expert testimony may be dispensed with, where the questioned material is such 'hard-core pornography' that it 'screams
for all to hear' as to its pornographic content." 1111 In 1987, the
same court reviewed the application of this "shortcut" in a case
where the trial judge did not apply the Miller test but instead
found the material "hard-core."1112 The appeals court held the
materials not obscene and not "hard-core, black market, under
the counter type," as the trial court had found, when compared
to the explicit and deviant materials found to be "hard-core" in
earlier cases. 1118 Although the material before the court did not
qualify as "hard-core," and did not meet the Miller test either,
the court said, "[I]t is not clear since Miller was decided by the
Supreme Court whether the 'evidentiary shortcut' is still viable,"
even though it is still "possible," but warned that "if trial judges
use the 'evidentiary shortcut' of Woodruff, they should state
with some particularity the reasons why they have found the
magazines or books to be obscene." 1 M
The proposed per se rule would eliminate any vagueness, by
covering only the type of hard-core material that depicts (not
describes) penetration clearly visible. Because this proposal is
completely objective, if a trial court found material to be hardcore pornography under the proposal, the appellate courts need
not differ with that application of the term.
Under the proposed per se hard-core rule, the pornographers,
the public, and the juries could apply the objective test to see if
149. Id. at 430, 159 N.W.2d at 7 (quoting A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of
a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413, 457 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
150. Whiting v. Roxy, Ltd., 66 Ohio Op. 2d 369, 371, 293 N.E.2d 889, 891 (C.P. 1973).
151. Woodruff v. State, 11 Md. App. 202, 226, 273 A.2d 436, 449 (1971) (citation
omitted).
152. 5297 Pulaski Highway v. Town of Perryville, 69 Md. App. 590, 519 A.2d 206
(1987).
153. Id. at 606, 519 A.2d at 214.
154. Id. at 604-05, 519 A.2d at 214.
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the material depicts explicit sex. The trial and appellate courts
could "conduct an independent review of constitutional claims
when necessary," as recognized in Miller. uio The Court in Miller
was concerned that "hard-core" pornography would be exposed
"without limit" if "the inability to define regulated materials
with ultimate, godlike precision altogether removes the power of
the states or the Congress to regulate. 111116 The Miller test allows
all obscenity to be determined, but the "hard-core" rule allows
the most obvious obscenity to be determined with ultimate,
though perhaps not "godlike," precision.
There is no guarantee that the United States Supreme Court
would uphold a ban on all commercial exploitation of hard-core
pornography without proof of its obscenity under the Miller
test. The Supreme Court, however, did uphold New York's child
pornography law without requiring proof of obscenity. 1117 Some
state or the Congress must lead the nation in new theories in
obscenity law and push the Court to approve these changes so
that others may follow. The Supreme Court already has given its
approval to many innovative solutions. In a Detroit zoning case
requiring the dispersal of sexually oriented businesses, Justice
Stevens wrote that "the city must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly serious
problems." 1118
New York has a history of leadership and innovation in obscenity laws, and the United States Supreme Court has supported New York's bold and intelligent moves. 1119 Since Ferber,
eighteen states have enacted statutes criminalizing the mere
possession of child pornography as per se illegal, and the state
supreme courts in Ohio, Alabama, and Illinois have sustained
those laws. 160 Sexual devices such as dildos and artificial genitals
155. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973).
156. Id. at 28.
157. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
158. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976) (upholding location
zoning of "adult" bookstores and theatres because of the "secondary effects" those businesses had on a downtown area, even though there was no determination that the bookstores and theatres trafficked in obscenity); see also City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
159. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (upholding New York's child pornography law); Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973) (upholding New York's use of
search warrants); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S 629 (1968) (upholding New York's
"harmful to minors" law); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966) (upholding New
York's application of "deviant" standards); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436
(1957) (upholding New York's injunction statute).
160. ALA. ConE § 13 A-12-192 (1982 & Supp. 1987); Amz. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 13-3553
(A)(2) (Supp. 1987); CoLO. REv. STAT. § 18-6-403 (1986); FLA. STAT ANN. § 827.071 (4)-(5)
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were classified as obscene devices and made illegal per se in
Georgia for commercial distribution. The Georgia Supreme
Court explicitly approved the statute161 and now Texas has upheld a similar law. 162 Treating hard-core pornography in the
same manner that the law treats child pornography and obscene
devices would provide a much needed definitive solution to the
pornography problem in America.
In a nationwide survey of law enforcement efforts after Miller,
a New York University Law Review study concluded that
"[o]bscenity laws have been characterized as having only a minimal effect on the conduct of prosecutors and pornographers. " 163
More than half of the prosecutors surveyed said Miller had no
effect on convictions, twenty-nine percent said Miller helped the
prosecution, and seventeen percent said it helped the defense. 1"
One of the responses, from an Ohio prosecutor, was typical in its
plea: "I would like to see communities given a definition by the
[Supreme Court] which would enable them to make a specific
listing of items which would be per se obscene by their legislative body's interpretation of the prevailing community standards. " 1611 The authors found that the public had become more
tolerant of pornographic material and concluded that this "liberalization of attitudes has in turn influenced prosecutors to handle only cases involving particularly hard core materials." 166
(Harrison Supp. 1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-100 (b)(8) (Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE
§ 18-1507A (1987); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-20.1(2) (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 213516 (Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 617.246 (4) (West 1987); Mo. REv. STAT§ 573.037
(Supp. 1987); NEB. REV. STAT.§ 28.808 (1988); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.730 (1987); OHIO
REV. CoDE ANN. § 2907.321 (Anderson 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1024.1-1024.2
(West 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-22-23.1 (1988); TEx. PENAL CoDE ANN.
§ 43.26 (Vernon Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 76-5a-3 (Supp. 1988); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9.68 A.o70 (1988); see State v. Meadows, 28 Ohio St. 3d 43, 503 N.E.2d 697
(1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1581 (1987); Felton v. State, 526 So. 2d 635 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1986), aff'd, 526 So. 2d 638 (Ala. 1988); People v. Geever, 122 Ill. 2d 313, 522
N.E.2d 1200 (1988).
161. Sewell v. State, 238 Ga. 495, 233 S.E.2d 187 (1977); Teal v. State, 143 Ga. App.
47, 238 S.E.2d 128 (1977) (upholding GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-80 (c) (1984)). Both Sewell
and Teal were dismissed "for want of substantial federal question" by the Supreme
Court, 435 U.S. 982 (1978); 435 U.S. 989 (1978). Such a dismissal of an appeal is a decision on the merits and affirms the state court decision. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332,
343-45 (1975).
162. Yorko v. State, 690 S.W.2d 260, 265-66 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (upholding TEx.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.21 (a)(7) (Vernon Supp. 1988)); see also Red Bluff Drive-In v.
Vance, 648 F.2d 1020, 1027-28 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 913 (1982) (upholding the Texas statute). But see People v. Seven Thirty-Five East Colfax, Inc., 697 P.2d
348, 368-70 (Colo. 1985).
163. Project, supra note 13, at 928.
164. Id. at 900.
165. Id. at 896 n.403.
166. Id. at 898.
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The Miller standard, as modified by Pope and Smith, 167 could
control the hard-core industry if vigorously enforced in most jurisdictions by federal and state prosecutors, as the Attorney
General's Commission recommended. 168 Its inherent weakness is
its subjective application in various local communities and the
undeniable confusion caused by differing interpretations of each
word of the test. The United States Supreme Court could cure
much of the problem by approving one proper charge to a jury
or one simple and correct statement of the test by a court. The
hard-core rule, on the other hand, would do in objectivity what
such a ruling by the Court would do in removing subjectivity. If
the law of obscenity-the so-called "intractable" problem 169-is
to be clarified, these changes should be made soon, before the
future becomes the past and we are forced to live forever with
the disgrace of the present.
CONCLUSION

Congress and the state legislatures should adopt an objective
definition of obscenity that would make all hard-core pornography per se illegal for commercial distribution. The Supreme
Court in analyzing the hard-core rule should apply the balancing
of interests test used to sustain the New York child pornography
law. In Ferber, the Court held that in rare instances, when "the
evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive
interests, if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudication is required." 170 In Pope, Justice Scalia approved an objective approach to the value prong of Miller and suggested that
perhaps a "reexamination" of Miller was in order. 171
Evidence of the harmful effects of pornography and law enforcement difficulties in this area172 are strong reasons for adoption of a per se rule. Hard-core pornography is most certainly an
area where "expressive interests," if any, are heavily outweighed
by the "evil to be restricted." 173
167. Pope v. lliinois, 107 S. Ct. 1918 (1987); Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291
(1977).
168. 1 COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 3, at 364-72.
169. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 16 (quoting Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas,
390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting)).
170. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1982).
171. Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1923 (Scalia, J., concurring).
172. See 1 CoMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 3, at 299-351.
173. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763-64.
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Intellectual freedom in America exists at a higher level than
viewing people engaged in various sexual acts. Voyeurism is not
a fundamental right. If Congress and state legislatures truly desire to preserve the traditional fabric of American society for future generations, they should adopt the most innovative and effective laws possible under our Constitution. In dealing with the
problem of hard-core pornography, a per se rule may be necessary to preserve our heritage.

